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IT’S NOT JUST FOR DEATH CASES ANYMORE: HOW CAPITAL 
MITIGATION INVESTIGATION CAN ENHANCE 
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING AND IMPROVE ADVOCACY IN 
LAW SCHOOL NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE CLINICS 
 
HUGH M. MUNDY* 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the last two decades, the total number of defendants facing 
federal criminal charges has skyrocketed.1  In 1995, 54,980 
defendants were charged in federal courts throughout the country.2  
By 2011, that number nearly doubled to 101,149 defendants.3  Almost 
90,000 defendants—about 90-percent of those charged—entered pleas 
of guilty.4  Strikingly, only 274 defendants—less than one percent—
were acquitted after a jury trial.5  In many states, the percentages of 
criminal defendants who pleaded guilty in 2011 are very similar to the 
federal totals.6  In effect, the term “trial lawyer” in the criminal 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author 
expresses his gratitude to Sheida Ahmadzadeh, Jillian Berner, Barry Chenman, Jesse 
Cheng, Gina DiCello, Olympia Duhart, Jillian Kassel, Lisa Lerman, Ashley 
Madonia, David Patton, Ellen Podgor, Alison Siegler, Jay Steed, and his family for 
their support, encouragement, and contributions to this article. 







6. For instance, in Pennsylvania, county-by-county statistics reflect higher 
percentages of guilty pleas than in federal courts.  See PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, 
31 
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defense context has become oxymoronic.  A more apt characterization 
is “guilty plea lawyer.” 
In every case involving a guilty plea, the defendant will be 
sentenced for the offense of conviction.7  Needless to say, in light of 
the enormous number of defendants who plead guilty, the effective 
assistance of counsel at sentencing is vital.8  By the same token, the 
ethical and professional requirements for sentencing counsel are 
considerable.9  Under American Bar Association (“ABA”) standards, 
“[d]efense counsel should present to the court [at sentencing] any 
ground which will assist in reaching a proper disposition favorable to 
the accused.”10  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has long 
held that the need for competent counsel may be greater at sentencing 
than in the determination of guilt because at sentencing “a judge 
usually moves within a large area of discretion and doubts. . . . Even 
the most self-assured judge may well want to bring to his aid every 
SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA: ANNUAL REPORT 46 (2011), available at 
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/annual-reports/2011-revised-10-11-
2012/view  In Montgomery County, 98% of the 5,521 defendants charged in 2011 
entered pleas of guilty while less than 1% opted for a jury trial.  Id. at 47.  In Bucks 
County, 98% of the 5,147 defendants charged in 2011 entered guilty pleas while less 
than 1% opted for a jury trial.  Id. at 46.  In less populous Butler County, every one 
of the 1,252 defendants charged in 2011 pleaded guilty.  Id.  In Illinois, between 
2000-2010 (the most recent years for which data are available), the Illinois 
Sentencing Policy Advisory Council reported that “trials accounted for less than 5% 
of felony convictions in eighty-two of Illinois’ 102 counties; looked at the other 
way, guilty pleas accounted for 95% or more of felony convictions in eighty-two of 
Illinois’ 102 counties.”  ILL. SENTENCING POL’Y ADVISORY COUNCIL, RESEARCH 
BRIEFING UPDATE: ILLINOIS FELONY SENTENCING – A RETROSPECTIVE 4 (2012).  
7. For analysis of federal criminal cases, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2011 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Publications/2012/FY11_O
verview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf (“The United States Sentencing Commission 
received information on 86,631 federal criminal cases in which the offender was 
sentenced in fiscal year 2011.  Among these cases, 86,201 involved an individual 
offender and 160 involved a corporation or ‘organizational’ offender.”) (emphasis 
added) (footnotes omitted).  
8. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385-86 (2012) (affirming that 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies at sentencing).  
9. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-8.1 (1993).   
10. Id. § 4-8.1(b). 
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consideration that counsel for the accused can appropriately urge.”11  
As a result, the failure of defense counsel to investigate, prepare, and 
present mitigating factors at sentencing can constitute ineffective 
assistance under the Sixth Amendment.12 
Fulfilling this duty in capital cases means that the defense team 
must conduct an exhaustive and meticulous investigation about 
matters including the defendant’s “childhood, upbringing, education, 
relationships, friendships, formative and traumatic experiences, 
personal psychology, and present feelings.”13  In turn, the evidence 
unearthed during the investigation must be transformed into a 
coherent, compelling, and comprehensive narrative of the defendant’s 
life for the mitigation presentation.14  However, this meticulousness 
during sentencing was solely reserved for capital cases until 2005. 
The professional and constitutional obligations of defense counsel 
in non-capital sentencing hearings have taken on heightened 
significance since the Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in United States v. 
Booker.15  In Booker, the Court declared that the mandatory United 
States Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury.16  To remedy the violation, the Booker majority rendered 
11. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 178 (1946). 
12. See, e.g., Grigg v. United States, 3:13-cv-00040 (Doc. No. 23) (M.D. 
Tenn. July 16, 2013) (concluding that defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance under the Sixth Amendment due to his failure to investigate potentially 
mitigating evidence, file mitigating evidence with the court before defendant’s 
sentencing hearing, or argue on behalf of defendant during the sentencing hearing); 
see also Berry v. Wolfbarger, No. 08-12894, 2010 WL 2681173 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 
2010).  
13. Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 324 (1983). 
14. Michael N. Burt, The Importance of Storytelling at All Stages of a Capital 
Case, 77 UMKC L. REV. 877, 879 (2009) (“‘If there is one dominant theme that 
explains [a successful defense], it is that the capital defendant’s attorney must tell a 
powerful and coherent story of injustice . . . .’”) (quoting WELSH S. WHITE, 
LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES 
178 (2006)) (alteration in original).   
15. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (expanding the role of 
the court’s discretion at sentencing, and thus expanding the defense counsel’s role in 
highlighting factors in the defendant’s favor at sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
(2000)).  
16. Id. at 245. 
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the Sentencing Guidelines “effectively advisory,”17 holding that the 
Sentencing Guidelines are only one of several factors that must be 
considered at sentencing.18  In addition to the Sentencing Guidelines, 
the Court cited broad statutory factors courts should consider, 
including the “history and characteristics of the defendant” and the 
“nature and circumstances of the offense.”19  Tracking the statutory 
mandate, the Court reasoned that lower courts must impose sentences 
that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”20 to achieve four 
essential goals: punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and 
rehabilitation of the defendant.21 
While both capital and non-capital sentencing hearings call for 
extensive mitigation investigation, critical differences still exist.  
Notably, in capital proceedings, the story—“stripped of legalese”—is 
at the heart of the sentencing.22  This makes sense.  After all, capital 
sentencing hearings involve presentations to juries, not judges.23  The 
primary objective of the defense team in capital sentencing 
proceedings is achieving a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole.24  As a result, the narrative is unconcerned with legal 
considerations regarding the appropriate range of imprisonment or 
terms of post-release supervision. 
Conversely, in non-capital federal proceedings, the defendant is 
sentenced by a judge who must cite both statutory authority and 
17. Id.; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 62 (2007) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (affirming the holding in United States v. Booker that the United Stated 
Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory).  
18. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 
19. Id. at 249 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
21. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60. 
22. Sean D. O’Brien, Death Penalty Stories: Lessons in Life-Saving 
Narratives, 77 UMKC L. REV. 831, 836 (2009). 
23. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (affirming the 
constitutionality of bifurcated capital proceedings including a “guilt phase” during 
which the jury determines the defendant’s guilt or innocence and, upon conviction, a 
“penalty phase” during which the jury decides whether the defendant should be put 
to death). 
24. See Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The 
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 360 (1993) (“[A] capital 
defense attorney’s central mission is to present the defendant’s ‘case for life’ . . . .”). 
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sentencing guidelines to justify the sentence.25  Thus, “legalese” 
matters.  That is, counsel in a non-capital case must link the mitigation 
presentation to the corresponding statutory sentencing factors and 
guidelines.26  Without this legal tether, counsel’s narrative, even if 
compelling, may not result in the desired outcome. 
Non-capital defense lawyers also face pragmatic obstacles to 
undertaking a “quasi-capital” mitigation investigation.  First, 
mitigation investigation is costly and time-consuming.27  Most 
defense lawyers, especially public defenders, are burdened with high 
caseloads and have limited investigative resources.28  Second, non-
capital defense lawyers often lack the experience and expertise of their 
capital brethren to effectively identify key mitigation evidence and use 
such evidence to paint a compelling portrait of the defendant at 
sentencing.29  Third, unlike the teams who represent capital 
defendants, the non-capital lawyer is generally the defendant’s sole 
advocate.30 
25. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46 (holding that federal courts must consider 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines ranges, but also may “tailor the sentence” 
according to the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
26. Id. 
27. Helen G. Berrigan, The Indispensable Role of the Mitigation Specialist in a 
Capital Case: A View from the Federal Bench, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 819, 825-30 
(2008) (discussing the “considerable amount of time” and high cost of a 
comprehensive mitigation investigation). 
28. See, e.g., Sequestering Justice: How the Budget Crisis is Undermining Our 
Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Bankr. and the Courts of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4 (2013) (statement of Hon. Julia S. Gibbons, Chair, Jud. 
Conf. Comm. on the Budget) (“[T]he pace at which criminal cases requiring court-
appointed counsel has continued unabated, while resources in the [Federal] 
Defender Services program are diminishing.”), available at 
http://news.uscourts.gov//sites/default/files/Judge-Gibbons-Testimony-07.23.13.pdf; 
see also Donald J. Farole, Jr. & Lynn Langton, A National Assessment of Public 
Defender Office Caseloads, 94 JUDICATURE 87 (2010) (reporting on the 
overwhelming caseloads and budget shortfalls experienced by state and local public 
defender offices). 
29. See RUSSELL STETLER, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, WHY 
CAPITAL CASES REQUIRE MITIGATION SPECIALISTS, available at 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/998934720.005 (“[L]awyers . . . generally 
lack the skills to conduct life-history investigation.”). 
30. See Am. Bar Ass’n, American Bar Association Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 952 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty 
                                                          
5
Mundy: It's Not Just for Death Cases Anymore: How Capital Mitigation Inv
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013
Mundy Final Edit.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2014  10:18 AM 
36 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
For non-capital criminal defense lawyers, increasingly complex 
post-Booker mitigation investigations are compounded by the ever-
increasing number of defendants entering guilty pleas and facing 
sentencing.  One method to confront both emerging challenges is the 
creation of a manageable, cost-effective, and replicable mitigation 
investigation model, tailored to the specific needs of non-capital 
counsel.  In fact, a blueprint for non-capital cases may be drawn from 
the essential techniques of capital mitigation investigation. 
As this article proposes, law school criminal defense clinics 
provide an excellent environment to design and implement a non-
capital mitigation investigation protocol based on the techniques used 
in death penalty cases.  From a pedagogical perspective, such a model 
promotes student development of foundational lawyering skills and 
values, especially in the vital area of “narrative thinking characteristic 
of everyday practice.”31  From a pragmatic standpoint, creation of a 
mitigation investigation model benefits clinic clients and boosts the 
likelihood that similar investigative methods will become a staple of 
the student’s post-graduate practice. 
Part I charts the evolution of capital mitigation investigation and 
highlights recent jurisprudence signaling a movement of concepts 
associated with capital mitigation to non-capital cases.  Part II 
provides a brief history of clinical legal education and outlines the 
structure and pedagogical goals of the non-capital criminal defense 
clinic.  Finally, Part III explores how the use of a capital mitigation 
investigative model in non-capital criminal defense clinics advances 
clinical pedagogical goals. 
PART I 
THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL MITIGATION INVESTIGATION 
Mitigation evidence in capital cases encompasses “facts about the 
defendant’s character or background, or the circumstances of the 
Cases] (recommending each capital defense team should consist of no fewer than 
two defense attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist). 
31. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD 
BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 96-97 (2007) (explaining that the “twofold aspect of 
professional expertise” required of lawyers is comprised of “analytical” and 
“narrative modes of reasoning”). 
                                                          
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol50/iss1/3
Mundy Final Edit.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2014  10:18 AM 
2013] IT’S NOT JUST FOR DEATH CASES ANYMORE 37 
particular offense, that may call for a penalty less than death.”32  
Capital mitigation jurisprudence traces its origins to Furman v. 
Georgia, in which the Supreme Court temporarily ended the death 
penalty while planting the seeds for the growth of mitigation 
evidence.33  In Furman, a narrow and fractured majority effectively 
eliminated every state death penalty statute by holding that 
discretionary death penalty laws—or those which give juries the 
unfettered choice to impose death—violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
bar against “cruel and unusual punishment.”34  In one of five separate 
concurring opinions, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the failure of 
such laws to provide meaningful sentencing guidance to jurors 
resulted in the “wanton[]” and “freakish[]” imposition of death 
sentences.35  In another concurring opinion, Justice William Brennan 
captured the essence of mitigation, emphasizing that the core concern 
“underlying” the Eighth Amendment “is nothing less than the dignity 
of man.”36 
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
post-Furman statute which separated death penalty proceedings into 
two phases: a guilt stage and a sentencing phase.37  In the initial stage, 
the jury or judge determined the defendant’s guilt or innocence.38  
Upon a finding of guilt, the proceedings moved to a second phase 
during which the jury or judge decided whether the defendant should 
be put to death for the offense.39  The Court concluded that the 
bifurcated scheme comported with Eighth Amendment restrictions as 
it contained structural mechanisms that reduced the risk of 
capriciously imposed death sentences.40  Namely, during the 
32. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987)). 
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[The death sentences at issue] are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual.”). 
36. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-69 (1976). 
38. Id. at 162-63. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 195. 
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sentencing phase, the jury was limited to consideration of certain 
aggravating and mitigating factors.41  In the majority’s view, these 
restrictions provided procedural safeguards to the sentencing phase 
and distinguished the law from overly discretionary statutes.42  After 
Gregg, the dual guilt and sentencing phase structure established the 
basic template for death penalty statutes across the country.43 
While Gregg was chiefly concerned with imposing limits on 
jurors’ sentencing discretion, two companion cases dealt with the 
constitutionality of statutes which eliminated discretion altogether.44  
In Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana, the Court 
struck down state laws mandating death for certain offenses.45  The 
Woodson Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes offer an 
unacceptable alternative to laws allowing “arbitrary and wanton jury 
discretion” as they preclude “particularized consideration of relevant 
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant.”46  
Likewise, in Roberts, the Court held that a Louisiana death penalty 
statute substituting “standardless jury discretion” with a “harsh[] and 
inflexible[]” mandatory standard overwhelms the constitutional 
requirement to “guide the jury in the exercise of its power to select 
those . . . who will receive death sentences.”47 
Gregg, Woodson, and Roberts established the constitutional 
framework for individualized sentencing of capital defendants.  
Subsequent cases established the expansive breadth and scope of 
admissible mitigation evidence.48  In Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme 
41. Id. at 196-97. 
42. Id. at 196-206 (holding that appellate review of the jury’s application of 
the aggravating and mitigation factors precludes the “random or arbitrary imposition 
of the death penalty”). 
43. See Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster’s Mental Health and Social 
History: Why Capital Defense Attorneys and Public Defender Death Penalty Units 
Require the Services of Mitigation Specialists, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 23, 40 
(2005) (“Since Gregg, capital trials have been divided into two phases”: a “guilt or 
innocence phase” and a “penalty phase.”). 
44. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
45. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. 
46. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. 
47. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332, 334-36. 
48. While the scope of mitigation has broadened since Gregg, the aggravating 
factors a jury may consider at sentencing remain structured.  The Supreme Court, 
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Court opened the mitigation floodgates, holding that the capital jury 
may consider “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any 
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.”49  The decisions that followed 
exemplified Lockett’s inclusive language, approving the use of 
mitigation evidence stretching from the defendant’s early childhood to 
predictors of his future conduct.50  Indeed, the Court has continually 
reiterated that a capital jury may consider a “potentially infinite” 
number of mitigating factors at sentencing.51  Concomitantly, the 
Court has established a low bar for the relevance of mitigation 
evidence, stating that admissibility hinges only on whether a juror 
could reasonably believe the evidence to be mitigating.52  In addition, 
the Court has refused to require a “nexus” between the proffered 
however, has endorsed the use of victim impact evidence during the sentencing 
phase to “‘keep the balance [between mitigation and aggravation evidence] true.’” 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not bar victim 
impact evidence). 
49. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
50. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-17 (1982) (reversing 
sentence of death due to state court’s failure to admit in mitigation evidence of the 
“background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant”); 
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (holding that sentencing jury could 
consider defendant’s “disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment 
to life in prison” as relevant to consideration of a life sentence instead of death). 
51. See, e.g., Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 21 (2006) (approving admission 
by state court of “forward-looking” mitigation evidence as predictor of defendant’s 
future conduct as one of the “potentially infinite mitigators”); Buchanan v. 
Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998) (“[O]ur cases have established that the 
sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, 
any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.”).  But see California v. Brown, 
479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (affirming use of an instruction admonishing jury not to be 
“swayed by ‘mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public 
opinion, or public feeling’” during sentencing phase of capital proceedings). 
52. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-85 (2004) (“Relevant mitigating 
evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or 
circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.”) 
(quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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mitigation evidence and the offense itself.53  Together, these standards 
have spawned a near-boundless mitigation universe.54 
A Primer on Capital Mitigation Investigation 
As the investigation, discovery, and use of mitigation evidence is 
essential in capital cases, the corresponding obligations on defense 
counsel are demanding.  Simply put, defense counsel must conduct a 
meticulous and intensive mitigation investigation.55  The Supreme 
Court has uniformly rejected that defense counsel can make a so-
called “strategic decision” to limit or abandon mitigation 
investigation.56  Likewise, counsel cannot “‘sit idly by, thinking that 
investigation would be futile.’”57  Nor can counsel rely on the client’s 
representations as to the lack of mitigation evidence or “statement[s] 
53. Id. at 287-89. 
54. See, e.g., id. at 287 (identifying evidence of low IQ as relevant mitigating 
evidence); Poyson v. Ryan, 685 F. Supp. 2d 956 (D. Ariz. 2010) (identifying 
substance abuse as a relevant mitigating factor); Jones v. Polk, 401 F.3d 257, 262-64 
(5th Cir. 2005) (identifying defendant’s remorse for offense as a relevant mitigating 
factor); Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2005) (identifying chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia as a relevant mitigating factor); Ex parte Hood, 304 S.W.3d 397, 401 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussing defense counsel’s introduction of poverty and 
possible brain damage as mitigation evidence); McGowan v. Thaler, 675 F.3d 482 
(5th Cir. 2012) (recognizing childhood neglect as a mitigating factor); Nelson v. 
Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 316 (5th Cir. 2006) (identifying borderline personality 
disorder and abandonment during childhood as relevant mitigating factors). 
55. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-99 (2000) (holding that 
counsel’s failure to commence mitigation investigation until a week prior to trial and 
failure to discover evidence relating to defendant’s “nightmarish childhood” and 
borderline mental retardation constituted ineffective assistance under the Sixth 
Amendment); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381-83 (2006) (holding that defense 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective due to his failure to examine a court file 
relating to a prior conviction that the Commonwealth planned to use as aggravating 
evidence). 
56. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (citing the “well-defined 
norms” set forth in the American Bar Association Guidelines in holding that defense 
counsel’s “rudimentary knowledge” of his client’s personal history and failure to 
expand the mitigation investigation beyond the facts in the pre-sentence 
investigative report fell below both professional and constitutional standards). 
57. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 1021 (quoting 
Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp. 901, 910 (N.D. Miss. 1980)). 
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that evidence . . . is not to be collected or presented.”58  Instead, 
counsel must undertake “extensive and generally unparalleled 
investigation into personal and family history . . . begin[ning] with the 
moment of [the client’s] conception.”59 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s resounding language about 
the duty to present mitigation evidence, the Court has given 
comparatively little guidance as to how defense counsel should 
investigate the defendant’s history, compile relevant information, or 
construct a compelling sentencing presentation.60  As a result, in the 
aftermath of Lockett, “defense teams were largely at a loss to figure 
out what to do with their newfound freedom.”61  As a further obstacle, 
most defense counsel lacked the time or training to meet the Court’s 
new demands.62  In light of the enormity and complexity of the 
mitigation process, capital defense teams began enlisting the 
assistance of “private investigators, . . . psychologists, journalists, 
anthropologists, and social workers.”63  From these diverse 
backgrounds, “defense team members giving undivided attention to 
the client’s life story” became known as “mitigation specialists.”64 
In 2003, the ABA updated its existing guidelines for 
representation of capital defendants (hereinafter “the ABA 
58. Id. at 1015; See also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 379 (counsel was not entitled to 
rely on defendant’s statement that he had “an unexceptional background” as basis to 
curtail mitigation investigation). 
59. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 1022 (quoting 
Russel Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 
1999, at 35) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60. Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and 
Logic of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 848 (2008) (describing the 
“unevenness” with which defense counsel undertook mitigation investigation after 
Lockett). 
61. Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 348 
(2009) (quoting Jesse Cheng, The Capital Ethnography Project, CHAMPION, July 
2006, at 53, 53) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
62. Berrigan, supra note 27, at 828 (“Lawyers are adept at legal analysis, 
fitting facts to legal principles, dissecting prior jurisprudence . . . . [They] are not 
trained in the communication (particularly listening) skills needed, nor perhaps do 
they have the time or patience, to delve deeply into the life history of their client.”). 
63. Hughes, supra note 61, at 343-44. 
64. Russell Stetler, Mitigation Investigation: A Duty that Demands Expert 
Help but Can’t Be Delegated, CHAMPION, Mar. 2007, at 61, 62. 
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Guidelines”) and added language requiring every capital defense team 
to include a mitigation specialist.65  Mitigation specialists play several 
vital roles for the defense.66  Importantly, they “compile[] a 
comprehensive and well-documented psycho-social history” of the 
defendant “based on an exhaustive investigation.”67  In addition, they 
“analyze[] the significance of the information in terms of impact on 
development” and “find[] mitigating themes” in the defendant’s 
background.68  Further, mitigation specialists assist in the 
identification and location of experts to examine the defendant or 
testify on his behalf.69  Mitigation specialists also guide the defense 
team in crafting a thorough, cogent, and persuasive story of the 
defendant’s life.70  As part and parcel of these multiple tasks, 
mitigation specialists often become the primary contact for the 
incarcerated client.71  In this way, mitigation specialists are central to 
earning the client’s trust and confidence, an indispensable function 
that impacts virtually every aspect of representation.72 
65. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 959.  
66. The duties of mitigation specialists differ based upon the demands of the 
case.  Thus, the following list is non-exhaustive and intended only to provide 
examples of common obligations.  For a closer examination of the mitigation 
specialist’s diverse contributions to the defense team, see Stetler, supra note 64, at 
62-63.  
67. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 959; see also 
Richard G. Dudley, Jr. & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It Right: Life History 
Investigation as the Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health Assessment, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 966 (2008) (“The fundamental duty of a mitigation specialist 
is to conduct a comprehensive life history investigation of the client and identify all 
relevant mitigation issues . . . .”). 
68. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 959.  
69. Id. 
70. Id.; see also Cooley, supra note 43, at 49-50 (“The Court’s limitless rule 
with respect to mitigation evidence enables defense counsel to construct a 
comprehensive, illustrative, and life-saving social history of capital defendants.”). 
71. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 960 (“The 
mitigation specialist often plays an important role . . . maintaining close contact with 
the client and his family while the case is pending.”). 
72. See White, supra note 24, at 338 (discussing the difficulty of establishing a 
“relationship of trust” between the capital client and counsel and the value of 
“patien[ce],” “loyalty,” and “understand[ing] the client’s view of reality” in 
overcoming mistrust); Berrigan, supra note 27, at 825 (“[Mitigation specialists] 
must be able to establish rapport with . . . the client, the client’s family and 
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“A comprehensive life history investigation requires the 
collection, organization, and analysis of data” about the defendant.73  
This process entails two fundamental components: extensive records 
collection and in-depth interviews with “almost anyone who was ever 
part of the defendant’s life.”74  Records collection is essential in 
building a framework for the mitigation narrative.75  The mitigation 
specialist should obtain, as a starting point, records of the defendant’s 
medical, educational, and employment history.76  In addition, records 
of the defendant’s prior incarceration or institutionalization, contact 
with social services or other governmental agencies, or military 
service often contain revealing historical information.77  The scope of 
records acquisition is broad, varied, and case-specific.78  It may 
encompass documents as personal as the defendant’s birth certificate 
and as far-reaching as studies detailing environmental contaminants to 
which the defendant, and entire communities, may have been 
significant others . . . .”) (quoting Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation 
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 682 
(2008) [hereinafter Supplementary Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases]) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra 
note 30, at 960 (“The rapport developed in this process can be the key to persuading 
a client to accept a plea to a sentence less than death.”). 
73. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 966. 
74. See Hughes, supra note 61, at 344 (discussing the latter fundamental 
component of the defendant’s life history investigation). 
75. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 966-67. 
76. Cooley, supra note 43, at 55, 63-64 (Records to be obtained “include, but 
are not limited to,” birth, schools, employers, military institutions, juvenile court, 
prison, medical, and psychiatric records.). 
77. Id.; see also Berrigan, supra note 27, at 826 (Records to be obtained 
“include school records, such as academic, disciplinary, and evaluative reports; 
medical records of accidents and illnesses; mental health evaluations; social services 
data, including welfare, adoption, or foster care records; juvenile delinquency and 
adult criminal records; employment history, military records, and any other 
institutional accounts.”). 
78. Additional challenges to records acquisition include the “various methods 
and mechanisms for requesting records” and the process of determining the specific 
waivers and releases required for the records sought.  Supplementary Guidelines in 
Death Penalty Cases, supra note 72, at 683.  For more on this subject, see Berrigan, 
supra note 27, at 825, and Cooley, supra note 43, at 61 (noting that a background in 
social work is “ideal,” in part, because it “enables mitigation specialists to . . . hunt 
down the necessary documentation” about the defendant).   
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exposed.79  The Supplementary Guidelines highlight the spacious 
parameters of records acquisition, calling for any document that sheds 
light on the defendant’s “capacity for redemption, remorse, . . . 
positive acts or qualities,” or “degree of moral culpability.”80 
Interviews are similarly critical.81  At the outset of the case, the 
mitigation specialist conducts the first in a series of interviews with 
the defendant.82  The initial conversation usually entails only an 
introduction and explanation of the mitigation specialist’s role on the 
defense team.83  The defendant’s ability and willingness to convey 
important information may be hampered by his distrust of the 
mitigation specialist, by mental illness or cognitive impairment, or by 
the emotional trauma of facing a capital charge.84  Therefore, follow-
up interviews with the defendant are crucial.85  From an investigative 
standpoint, the ongoing process invariably yields information with 
which to delve more deeply into the defendant’s background.86  Of 
equal value, multiple interviews help strengthen the defendant’s 
confidence in the defense team and allow the mitigation specialist to 
gain insight into the defendant’s ability to communicate, interact, and 
develop interpersonal relationships.87 
79. Hughes, supra note 61, at 346. 
80. Supplementary Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 72, at 679. 
81. See Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 968-69; see also Berrigan, supra 
note 27, at 824 (“[Mitigation specialists] must be able to identify, locate and 
interview relevant persons . . . .”) (quoting Supplementary Guidelines in Death 
Penalty Cases, supra note 72, at 682) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
82. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 969. 
83. Id. 
84. See Haney, supra note 60, at 877 (commenting on the possibility that 
“certain capital defendants” will be “initially uncooperative” or “suspicious of the 
interviewers’ motives” or unwilling to discuss “sensitive, personal, or painful” 
information); see also Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 969 (noting that “if a 
defendant’s mental illness presents difficulties between the defense team and the 
client, observations, data, and insight acquired by the mitigation specialist will 
inform mental health experts.”). 
85. See Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 969. 
86. See id. at 969-70. 
87. Id. (listing additional benefits of a series of interviews, including allowing 
the mitigation specialist to “observe, over time, the defendant’s gait, mental state, 
affect regulation, memory, comprehension of writing and speech, adaptation to 
incarceration, capacity to form interpersonal relationships, and remorse.”). 
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To create an inclusive, detailed, and accurate social history, the 
interview process extends far beyond the defendant’s cell.88  
Additional interview subjects typically include family members, 
friends, neighbors, former employers or coworkers, and any other 
individuals who may lend insight into the defendant’s background.89  
Through interviews, the mitigation specialist endeavors to learn 
“everything there is to know about the defendant” and those who have 
impacted his life—“even his nemeses.”90  The interview process, 
though, is fraught with obstacles.  Subjects are reluctant to speak to an 
advocate for the defendant in some cases, especially if the facts 
surrounding the charges are shocking.91  In addition, family members 
may be loath to disclose abuse or neglect of the defendant during 
childhood or adolescence.92  The interview process rarely results in a 
tidy and consistent chronology of the defendant’s life.93  As a result, 
the mitigation specialist must construct a credible and cohesive social 
history from different, and sometimes conflicting, accounts.94 
Mitigation specialists’ analysis of the voluminous information 
must be multi-faceted, complicated, and “painstaking.”95  One key 
objective is identification of noteworthy patterns or “mitigating 
themes” in the defendant’s life around which to structure the 
narrative.96  Also critical is review of the evidence for indicators of 
88. See id.; see also Hughes, supra note 61, at 344-47 (discussing the plethora 
of information mitigation specialists seek to uncover). 
89. Berrigan, supra note 27, at 826 (stating that the list of potential 
interviewees may extend to “institutional employees” if the defendant has been 
incarcerated in the past). 
90. Hughes, supra note 61, at 346. 
91. Berrigan, supra note 27, at 826 (noting that accusations of a “horrendous 
crime” may “drive [interview subjects] away”). 
92. Id. (discussing the “understandabl[e] reluctan[ce]” of family members to 
“disclose maltreatment or failure”); Haney, supra note 60, at 877. 
93. Haney, supra note 60, at 877 (highlighting the importance of reconciling 
the “numerous facts, events, and interrelationships” into a “thematic and coherent” 
account). 
94. Id. at 875-76. 
95. Id. at 876-77 (describing the mitigation specialist’s “emotionally 
wrenching” experience of “absorbing the pain that is present in the life stories of the 
persons” interviewed).  
96. Hughes, supra note 61, at 346 (quoting ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty 
Cases, supra note 30, at 859) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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learning disabilities, psychological disorders, or other cognitive 
impairments that may affect the defendant’s competency or 
necessitate evaluation or treatment by experts.97  At times the 
mitigation investigation may uncover witness accounts of the charged 
offense or other evidence that proves central to the theory of the 
defense.98  Thus, the defense team must also review the mitigation 
evidence for its potential trial value.99 
Construction of a “life history chronology” often serves as “the 
most basic organizing tool” for various types of evidence, including 
records and interview transcripts.100  In a chronology of the 
defendant’s life, “trends” or “causal factors” typically “emerge” that 
provide a springboard for more detailed follow-up.101  Another useful 
compilation technique is the creation of “genograms” (also known as 
“family trees”) to map the defendant’s family history and identify 
common threads related to mental illness or substance abuse.102  In 
similar fashion, the development of “ecological charts” (or 
“ecomaps”) can help the mitigation specialist trace societal or 
environmental conditions that may have impacted the defendant’s 
development.103 
The evidence must also be analyzed through the lens of the 
defendant’s cultural background and heritage.104  In many capital 
97. Berrigan, supra note 27, at 827. 
98. While most commonly associated with sentencing, the mitigation narrative 
is also often critical during plea negotiations, at trial, or even to the determination of 
a specific charge filed.  Therefore, the process of constructing a full and detailed 
account of the defendant’s personal history must begin “as quickly as possible.”  
ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 1023. 
99. Id.; see also Berrigan, supra note 27, at 829 (Aside from its possible use at 
trial, mitigation evidence “may even persuade the prosecution to forgo capital 
punishment and settle for life imprisonment on a guilty plea.”). 
100. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 973. 
101. Id. (“For example, records indicating that the client’s mother drank 
alcohol during her early teenage years would lead the mitigation specialist to 
question the mother, her family, and friends regarding her history of alcohol 
use. . . .”). 
102. Id. at 974. 
103. Id.  
104. See Guy Ben-David, Cultural Background as a Mitigating Factor in 
Sentencing in the Federal Law of the United States, 47 NO. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 1 
(2011) (discussing the importance of information about a defendant’s cultural 
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cases, cultivating a persuasive narrative involves debunking myths 
associated with the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or religious views.105  
The mitigation narrative may require an explanation of the 
defendant’s struggle with assimilation into an unfamiliar community 
or other “cultural dislocations.”106  Similarly, the abuse or 
maltreatment of the defendant, as detailed in the narrative, may have 
roots in cultural norms or practices.107  To this end, the ABA 
Guidelines specifically recognize the impact of “cultural or religious 
influence” as a possible mitigation factor.108 
Finally, the defense team must compose a mitigation narrative 
through which the defendant’s life will be made real to jurors.109  The 
narrative must, of course, be “accurate” and “credible.”110  But, 
“creating a resonant mitigation case [also] requires constructive 
imagination.”111  According to pioneering mitigation specialist 
background in mitigation, as stereotypes about race, culture, and ethnicity can lead 
to “erroneous predictions of dangerousness” or propensity for rehabilitation).  
105. Id. 
106. Scharlette Holdman & Christopher Seeds, Cultural Competency in 
Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 883, 897 (2008) (quoting Mak v. Blodgett, 
970 F.2d 614, 617 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107. Id. at 912; see also Ben-David, supra note 104, at n.96 (quoting United 
States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D. N.Y. 1992)) (explaining that a 
woman’s criminal culpability may be affected by the coercion of a spouse, and a 
“male’s control” over his spouse may be the “result” of “cultural norms”). 
108. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 1022, 1026 
(“If a client is a relatively recent immigrant, counsel must learn about the client’s 
culture, about the circumstances of his upbringing in his country of origin, and about 
the difficulties the client’s immigrant community faces in this country.”). 
109. For an insightful look into the power of the narrative in the trial context, 
see John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a 
Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1088 (2007) (“Stories provide useful structures: plot, 
characters, time frames, motives, and settings, which help jurors process and 
understand what is otherwise complex and sometimes unfamiliar information.”). 
110. Haney, supra note 60, at 876; see also Burt, supra note 14, at 880 
(“[D]efense attorneys cannot engage in fiction or . . . invent a character out of whole 
cloth to suppress the ‘real’ image of their client, already convicted of a heinous 
crime.”) (quoting Cary Federman, Book Review, 42 NO. 6 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 6 
(2006) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)  
111. Eric M. Freedman, Introduction: Re-Stating the Standard of Practice for 
Death Penalty Counsel: The Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function 
of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 663, 669 (2008). 
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Scharlette Holdman, the process of transforming voluminous 
mitigation evidence into a structured and persuasive narrative is “‘a 
very specialized, complex undertaking.’”112  Holdman says, “‘That 
narrative is not there for the asking . . . . It requires not just knowledge 
and skill but experience in how you search for, identify, locate, 
recognize, and preserve the information.’”113 
A convincing narrative paints a holistic portrait of the defendant 
rather than “simply present[ing] a catalog of seemingly unrelated 
mitigating factors.”114  Likewise, it must transcend a blow-by-blow 
chronicling of the defendant’s traumatic history.115  The narrative 
should reflect both the defendant’s suffering and his “admirable 
attempts to overcome the obstacles that have been placed before 
[him].”116  Detailed illustrations of specific impactful moments of the 
defendant’s life help to highlight his uniqueness and humanity.117  In 
providing a multi-dimensional view of the defendant, the narrative 
offers the jury a viable alternative to the prosecution’s portrayal of the 
defendant as “pure evil.”118 
In similar fashion, the narrative must extend beyond a third person 
account of the events that impacted the defendant and integrate the 
perspectives of those who observed or shared in his life 
experiences.119  Doing so lends credibility and immediacy to the 
narrative and, more critically, compels the audience to bear witness to 
the defendant’s struggles.120  Further, the narrative should provide a 
112. Jeffrey Toobin, The Mitigator: A New Way of Looking at the Death 
Penalty, NEW YORKER, May 9, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/09/110509fa_fact_toobin. 
113. Id. 
114. O’Brien, supra note 22, at 835 (quoting ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty 
Cases, supra note 30, at 1061) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
115. Haney, supra note 60, at 880 (“An authentic life narrative includes all 
facets of the defendant’s life story, including . . . . evidence [of his] admirable 
qualities.”). 
116. Id. 
117. Burt, supra note 14, at 884 (discussing the use of detail to “draw the 
reader into the client’s life and community.”). 
118. Craig Haney, On Mitigation as Counter-Narrative: A Case Study of the 
Hidden Context of Prison Violence, 77 UMKC L. REV. 911, 919 (2009).  
119. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 976. 
120. Id. 
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broad backdrop for past behavior and actions by illustrating how 
“forces the defendant did not choose and over which he had little or 
no control” influenced his life.121  The narrative, then, must juxtapose 
those outside “forces” against the defendant’s past success or potential 
to thrive under less dire circumstances.122 
At best, mitigation narratives reveal the “unknown story” of the 
defendant through the thoughtful reconstruction of the events, 
circumstances, and conditions that colored his life.123  In so doing, the 
narrative compels its audience to measure the defendant’s life in 
totality rather than by the single act for which he was convicted.124  
When this happens, the work of the mitigation specialist enlivens 
Justice Brennan’s words in Furman by safeguarding the dignity of the 
capital defendant, regardless of the outcome in the case.125 
Capital Mitigation Investigation and Non-Capital Cases: “Slow but 
Steady Advances” 
In a 2008 article, Craig Haney, a University of California 
psychology professor and expert on the psychological effects of 
incarceration, described “slow but steady advances” in the “Supreme 
Court’s understanding” of “how central mitigation is to a 
constitutional system of death sentencing.”126  This “progression,” 
Haney posited, was most fully realized in Wiggins v. Smith and 
121. Haney, supra note 60, at 881. 
122. Id. at 880-81. 
123. Russell Stetler, The Unknown Story of a Motherless Child, 77 UMKC L. 
REV. 947, 951-62 (2009) (detailing the creation of the “unknown story” of the 
defendant’s tumultuous life and mental illness after re-investigation into his 
background).  
124. Haney, supra note 60, at 880 (explaining that the narrative must 
“accurately depict[]” the defendant “as someone whose value and worth extends 
beyond the worst things he has done.”); see also O’Brien, supra note 22, at 831 
(noting that “life-saving [mitigation] narratives” have the potential to “evoke” in 
jurors a blend of compassion, “mercy,” and “understanding sufficient to spare” the 
convicted from execution.). 
125. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
126. Haney, supra note 60, at 836-37; see also O’Brien, supra note 22, at 837 
(“A co-author of the Stanford Prison Experiment, Dr. Haney has long been 
concerned about the dehumanizing effects of capital punishment and incarceration 
on both inmates and correctional officers.”). 
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Rompilla v. Beard.127  In both cases, the Court determined that 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failure to properly 
investigate or present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase 
of capital proceedings.128  Haney noted that, in Wiggins, the Court 
“finally acknowledged–in a clear and definitive way–the importance 
of developing and, when appropriate, presenting a mitigating social 
history.”129  Haney further noted that, in Rompilla, the Court took a 
further step, opining that some mitigation investigation is an 
insufficient substitute for a “comprehensive and vigorous” one.130  
Writing for the Court, Justice Souter acknowledged that Rompilla’s 
defense counsel conducted a partial mitigation investigation but stated 
that “undiscovered mitigating evidence” about Rompilla’s history of 
poverty and abuse “taken [with other evidence], might well have 
influenced the jury’s appraisal of [his] culpability.”131 
Since Haney’s article, the Supreme Court has continued to 
confirm the need for mitigating evidence at sentencing.132  
Interestingly, its most recent, and perhaps strongest affirmation, came 
in two non-capital cases, Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs.133  
In these companion consolidated cases, the Court highlighted the 
importance of an in-depth presentation of the offender’s background 
and the circumstances of his offense in mitigation of his sentence.134  
Both Miller and Jackson involved 14-year-old boys who were 
sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for first-degree 
murder.135 
127. Haney, supra note 60, at 851-55 (discussing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard 545 U.S. 374 (2005)). 
128. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383. 
129. Haney, supra note 60, at 851. 
130. Id. at 853. 
131. Id. at 855 (quoting Rompilla, 544 U.S. at 393) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
132. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollom, 558 U.S. 30, 30-31, 40 (2009) (per curiam) 
(holding that defense counsel’s failure to “uncover and present” mitigating evidence 
regarding defendant’s mental health, family background, or military history 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). 
133. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
134. Id. at 2467-68. 
135. Id. at 2460. 
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Kuntrell Jackson was charged with felony murder and aggravated 
robbery in Arkansas after participating in the hold-up of a video store 
during which one of his cohorts shot and killed the store clerk.136  
Following his trial conviction, the court imposed a statutorily 
mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.137  Evan Miller and a friend ended a night of drinking and drug 
use in Alabama by beating a neighbor and setting fire to his trailer.138  
The neighbor died and Miller was tried as an adult for murder in the 
course of arson.139  He was convicted after a trial and, like Jackson, 
received a mandatory life-without-parole sentence.140  Both 
defendants challenged their sentences in state proceedings, arguing 
that a life sentence imposed upon a juvenile violates the Eighth 
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.141  Neither 
prevailed and the Supreme Court granted the ensuing petitions for 
certiorari.142 
The Court struck down both sentences as unconstitutional.143  In 
so doing, the majority began from the premise that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against “excessive sanctions” stems “from the 
basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to both the offender and offense.”144  Notably, the 
majority then applied and extended the logic of two prior cases 
involving juveniles: Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida.145  
“Roper held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for 
children,”146 and Graham “likened life without parole for juveniles to 
the death penalty” and rejected such sentences for non-homicide 
136. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012). 
137. Id.   
138. Id. at 2462. 
139. Id. at 2462-63. 
140. Id. at 2463. 
141. Id. at 2461, 2463 (Jackson did not appeal his sentence but later filed a 
state petition for habeas corpus relief; Miller appealed his sentence.). 
142. Id.  
143. Id. at 2469. 
144. Id. at 2463 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
145. Id. at 2463-68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-71; Graham v. Florida, 560  
U.S. 48 (2010)). 
146. Id. at 2463 (discussing Roper, 543 U.S. at 578). 
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offenses.147  In step with Roper and Graham, the Miller court opined 
that a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile convicted 
of homicide is disproportionately severe given the “class of 
offender[].”148 
Importantly, the Miller majority also relied on Woodson—the 
North Carolina case in which the Court barred statutorily mandated 
death sentences—in support of its favorable position towards 
individualized sentences for juveniles.149  The Miller Court stressed 
that mandatory life sentences for juveniles foreclose essential 
sentencing considerations such as: (1) the offender’s “family and 
home environment;” (2) “the way familial and peer pressures may 
have affected [the offender]”; (3) “the circumstances of the . . . 
offense, including the extent of [the offender’s] participation”; and (4) 
“the possibility of rehabilitation.”150 
Turning to the specific case facts, the Court observed that 
Jackson’s “age could well have affected his calculation of the risk that 
[the shotgun] posed” and cited his “background and immersion in 
violence,” including his family history of gun-related violence.151  
Miller’s case also included substantial mitigating factors, beginning 
with an early childhood pockmarked by physical abuse, followed by at 
least four suicide attempts, which culminated with heavy drug and 
alcohol use on the night of the incident.152  While the Court readily 
acknowledged that both defendants deserved “severe punishment,” “a 
sentencer needed to examine all [possible mitigating factors] before 
concluding that life without any possibility of parole was the 
appropriate penalty.”153 
While the Roper-Graham-Miller trilogy concerns the sentencing 
of juveniles, two aspects of the cases suggest a continued shift 
demonstrating how central mitigation is to all sentencing.  First, the 
line of cases originated with Roper, a capital case, before the Court 
147. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (discussing Graham, 
560 U.S. at 81-82).  
148. Id. at 2471-73. 
149. Id. at 2467 (discussing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 
(1976)). 
150. Id. at 2468. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 2469. 
153. Id. 
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extended the same principles applied in capital cases to non-capital 
cases.154  Second, the ruling of unconstitutionality rested on the 
proportionality of sentencing as measured against a range of 
mitigating factors.155  The Court in Miller cited Woodson, a capital 
case, as instructive about the value of individualized sentencing in 
non-death cases.156  Specifically, the Court reiterated that the critical 
flaw in Woodson’s mandatory capital sentencing mechanism was its 
failure to give “significance to ‘the character and record of the 
individual offender or the circumstances’ of the offense, and [its] 
‘exclud[ing] from consideration . . . the possibility of compassionate 
or mitigating factors.’”157  Again, while Woodson contemplated a 
death statute, the Court’s extension of similar concerns to a non-
capital sentence is striking. 
PART II 
THE ROLE OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION IN IMPROVING MITIGATION 
INVESTIGATION AND PRESENTATION 
Miller’s bridging of the two historically “different” worlds of 
capital and non-capital jurisprudence highlights the critical value of 
mitigation evidence in all cases, as well as the obligation of defense 
counsel to dig deeply into the client’s past.158  Despite the clear 
mandate from the Supreme Court and the ABA, many criminal 
154. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466-67 (2012).  Indeed, the Miller 
Court observed that its decision in Graham was “unprecedented” for its treatment of 
a term of life imprisonment as “akin to the death penalty.”  Id.  
155. Id. at 2464-66.  Mitigating factors include “lack of maturity” and 
“vulnerab[ility]” to “negative influences,” developmental issues such as the 
“fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,” and the comparatively 
favorable “prospects for reform” between children and adults.  Id. (quoting Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156. Id. at 2467. 
157. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).  
158. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of 
death is different in kind from any other punishment . . . .”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (noting that the death penalty is “qualitatively different from 
any other sentence” (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002) (reiterating that there is “no 
doubt that ‘[d]eath is different’” (alteration in original) (quoting counsel)). 
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defense lawyers—especially those in the non-capital world—still 
possess a limited view of mitigation.159  As mitigation specialist Jesse 
Cheng explains, “Lawyers are not trained in the communication or 
listening skills needed [for mitigation investigation.  To the contrary,] 
lawyers are trained to find the right facts to fit the right doctrinal 
boxes or principles of case law in order to advance their arguments.  
But mitigation is a considerably more expansive practice.”160 
 A 2007 Carnegie Foundation-funded study on legal education 
(hereinafter “the Carnegie Report”) supports Cheng’s critique.161  
Drawing on cognitive science, the study’s authors posit that law 
schools are very good at teaching “‘analytic’ or ‘paradigmatic’” 
thinking.162  Analytic thinking, the process associated with the 
traditional casebook lecture, “detaches things and events from the 
situations of everyday life and represents them in more abstract and 
systematic ways.”163  Skills such as “ranking and ordering,” 
“[e]stablishing cause-and-effect,” and identifying “logical 
relationships” fall within this category.164  While the development of 
these skills is essential for law students, the practice of law also 
depends on expertise in “narrative modes of thinking.”165  Narrative 
thinking, in contrast to analytic, is premised on the theory that “things 
and events acquire significance by being placed within a story, an 
ongoing context of meaningful interaction.”166  The study emphasizes 
that effective legal practice requires “fluency” in both narrative 
thinking and analytic thinking.167 
As the Carnegie Report recommends, clinical legal education 
offers one avenue for students to receive training in the practice-
oriented skills associated with narrative thinking.168  Clinical 
159. E-mail from Jesse Cheng, Capital Mitigation Specialist, to author (Jan. 5, 
2013, 11:05 p.m. EST) (on file with author).  
160. Id. 
161. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 96-97. 
162. Id. (quoting JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 
(1985)). 
163. Id. at 96. 
164. Id. at 96-97. 
165. Id. at 97. 
166. Id. at 96. 
167. Id. at 97.   
168. Id. at 96-97, 195. 
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programs, say the study’s authors, comprise an important part of 
“integrative strategy” to complement the historically theory-focused 
approach of law schools.169  A look at the origins and development of 
law school legal clinics lends insight into how contemporary clinical 
education helps shape “the analytical and practical habits of mind that 
professional practice demands.”170 
A Brief History of Law School Clinics 
In 1933, John Bradway, the director of the Legal Aid Clinic at the 
Duke University School of Law, proposed in a landmark article to 
“bridge[] the gap between the theory of law school and the practice of 
the profession” by integrating clinics into the traditional 
curriculum.171  Bradway argued that clinical education teaches 
students to apply substantive and procedural law from coursework “in 
the solution of actual unsolved human problems”172 and analyze legal 
questions from their beginnings rather than as “a completed case 
embalmed on a printed page.”173  In tandem with “instruction by 
lectures and textbooks,”174  Bradway championed the role of clinics in 
developing “well rounded student[s]”175 who demonstrate 
“proficiency, dependability, social viewpoint, and the other 
characteristics of a good lawyer in active practice.”176  Bluntly, he 
warned: “The student suffers if he does not have clinical [legal] 
training.”177 
While the concept of clinical legal education originated in the 
early twentieth century, Bradway’s indictment of “law in books” 
169. Id. at 191, 195-96. 
170. Id. at 97 (“How to blend the analytical and practical habits of mind that 
professional practice demands is, we believe, the most complex and interesting 
pedagogical challenge in the preparation of legal practitioners.”). 
171. John S. Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic 
Course, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470 (1933). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 471. 
174. Id. at 472. 
175. Id. at 477. 
176. Id. at 478-79. 
177. Id. at 477. 
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provided a clarion call for advocates of “learn[ing] by doing.”178  He 
was joined by other critics of “needlessly abstract” law school 
curricula.179  In a 1933 article, Judge Jerome Frank compared law 
students without practical training to “prospective dog breeders who 
never see anything but stuffed dogs.”180  Soon thereafter, Columbia 
professor Karl Llewellyn argued that law schools should withhold a 
student’s degree until the successful completion of a post-graduate 
apprenticeship.181  Without the introduction of meaningful and 
innovative methods to train students, Llewellyn predicted that law 
school education would remain “inadequate, wasteful, blind and 
foul.”182  His colorful admonition notwithstanding, theory-centered 
courses remained the bulwark of legal education for the next several 
decades.183 
The modern law school clinic began to take shape in the late 
1960s amidst changing views about the role and function of the legal 
profession.184  In the wake of new federal anti-poverty initiatives and 
the robust civil rights movement, broad coalitions of lawyers 
embraced a philosophy that the law could act as an instrument for 
positive social change.185  Further, the 1963 Supreme Court decision 
in Gideon v. Wainwright, requiring counsel for indigent criminal 
178. Douglas A. Blaze, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of 
Clinical Education, 64 TENN. L. REV. 939, 945 (1997) (quoting JOHN S. BRADWAY, 
BASIC LEGAL AID CLINIC MATERIALS AND EXERCISES ON TAKING HOLD OF A CASE 
AT LAW 6 (1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179. Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 675 (1935). 
180. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 
907, 912 (1933). 
181. Llewellyn, supra note 179, at 675-76. 
182. Id. at 677-78 (“We put out course-books, which make one man’s 
experience in part available to many other men.  But as to method of teaching–there 
we balk at communication, we balk at analysis.  This is idiocy, plain and drooling.”).  
183. See Blaze, supra note 178, at 941 (describing the growth in clinical legal 
education movement beyond the 1950s). 
184. Norman Fell, Development of a Criminal Law Clinic: A Blended 
Approach, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 275, 277 (1996). 
185. Alan W. Houseman, Legal Aid History, in POVERTY LAW MANUAL FOR 
THE NEW LAWYER 18, 19-20 (2002), available at http://web.jhu.edu/prepro/law/Pre-
Law.Forms.WordDocs/Public.Interest.Law.1.pdf. 
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defendants charged with felonies,186 created a demand for competent 
defense attorneys.187  Buoyed by grants from the Council on Legal 
Education for Professional Responsibility (“CLEPR”), a non-profit 
organization established by the Ford Foundation, a wave of law school 
clinics emerged to provide free legal assistance to low-income 
communities, help fulfill Gideon’s mandate, and promote equal access 
to the justice system.188  Over the life of CLEPR funding, nearly half 
of the law schools in the country created clinical programs.189 
The rapid rise of clinics, aside from their place within the social 
justice trends of the era, was hastened by evolving views about the 
pedagogical value of practical training for law students.190  The 
growth of reform-minded legal activism brought with it a new regard 
for experiential learning designed to prepare law students for direct 
client representation.191  To be sure, skills-based curricula were still 
widely regarded as progressive and, in most cases, inferior to the 
traditional “case-dialogue” model.192  Nonetheless, legal clinics 
offered an ideal setting for a growing number of students interested in 
putting casebook lectures into practice while responding to a larger 
moral and social calling.193 
186. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
187. See Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 
SMU L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1998) (discussing the growth of legal clinics to serve 
social justice considerations, particularly to provide “free legal services to indigent 
clients.”). 
188. Id. at 1464-66. At the same time, the value of law students representing 
indigent client was not lost on the Supreme Court.  In his concurring opinion in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972), Justice Brennan observed that “law 
students can be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and 
qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including cases 
reached by [our] decision [requiring that criminal defendants facing possible 
incarceration must be represented by counsel].” 
189. Mary Berkheiser, Frasier Meets Clea: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and 
Law School Clinics, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1147, 1153 (1999). 
190. Fell, supra note 184, at 278. 
191. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 92. 
192. Id. at 92-93 (“[Traditional] [c]urricula did not change much, but some 
law schools began to experiment with teaching the rules of professional 
responsibility within practice settings . . . .”). 
193. Suzanne Valdez Carey, An Essay on the Evolution of Clinical Legal 
Education and Its Impact on Student Trial Practice, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 509, 513 
(2003); Dubin, supra note 187 at 1466. 
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Over the last four decades, clinical legal education has slowly 
developed into “an integral component of law school instruction.”194  
Though at times halting, the growth of clinics has been spurred by 
continued critiques that law schools prize doctrine over skills 
development.195  In 1992, the ABA released the MacCrate Report, 
encouraging law schools to address the disparity between legal 
education and the actual practice of law through the development of 
clinical programs.196  More recently, the authors of the Carnegie 
Report concluded that law schools have unmet duty to equip students 
with “the reflective capacity and motivation to pursue genuine 
expertise.”197  To better shape competent practitioners, the study’s 
recommendations include that third-year law students “engage in 
advanced clinical training.”198  The MacCrate and Carnegie Reports 
have proved instrumental in boosting the presence of legal clinics and 
reaffirming their critical role within law schools.199 
The Law School Criminal Defense Clinic: A Basic Structure 
As Bradway envisioned, contemporary law school clinics provide 
students with opportunities to work with clients, collaborate with 
practicing attorneys, craft case strategies, and participate in court 
194. Valdez Carey, supra note 193, at 509. 
195. Dubin, supra note 187, at 1468. 
196. AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 




197. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 173. 
198. Id. at 195. 
199. Dubin, supra note 187, at 1469 (“From 1992 to 1998, the number of law 
school faculty teaching in clinical courses has increased from approximately 850 to 
1150.”); see also ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION viii 
(2007), available at http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best_practices-
full.pdf (“The central message in both Best Practices and in the contemporaneous 
Carnegie report is that law schools should . . . broaden the range of lessons they 
teach, reducing doctrinal instruction that uses the Socratic dialogue and the case 
method . . . .”).  
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hearings.200  Through clinical education, students acquire a spectrum 
of essential lawyering skills and receive a first chance to apply 
procedural and substantive law in a “real life” context.201  
Additionally, students develop professional responsibility by learning 
to balance the day-to-day demands of a case, resolve ethical 
quandaries, and effectively communicate with the bar and bench.202  
Moreover, in the spirit of their 1960s predecessors, many current law 
school clinics serve the public interest through representation of low-
income clients who would otherwise be unable to afford competent 
counsel.203 
Criminal defense clinics exemplify a model designed to combine 
the experiential learning ideals upon which clinical legal education 
was founded with the essential access to justice concerns brought to 
the forefront by Gideon.204  Structurally speaking, most criminal 
defense clinics resemble small law firms housed within the law 
school.205  A clinic director—or, in some cases, two co-directors—
200. Ann Marie Cavazos, The Journey Toward Excellence in Clinical Legal 
Education: Developing, Utilizing and Evaluating Methodologies for Determining 
and Assessing the Effectiveness of Student Learning Outcomes, 40 SW. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2010). 
201. William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New 
Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 471-
73 (1995); see also PHILIP G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER, REFLECTIONS ON 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 250 (1998) (“Exploring ethical dilemmas before they 
are resolved, and while students and teachers must make agonizing decisions and 
then live with the consequences, makes . . . clinic work lively.”). 
202. Blaze, supra note 178, at 949 (“The difference between [skills and 
professional responsibility—as defined by University of Tennessee Legal Clinic 
founder Charles H. Miller—]‘is roughly comparable to the difference between the 
carpenter’s ability to hammer a nail . . . and, on the other hand, the architect’s 
capacity to design and supervise the construction of a building which is suitable to 
the needs of his client.’” (quoting CHARLES H. MILLER, LIVING PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: CLINICAL APPROACH 5 (1973) (unpublished manuscript)). 
203. Valdez Carey, supra note 193, at 517-18. 
204. Id. at 519 (“Cases litigated in service-oriented or law-reform clinics can 
be used in reaching educational goals for law students as well as achieving positive 
outcomes for clients or instigating societal or legal reform.”). 
205. The structural model I discuss is reflective of a typical “in-house” 
criminal defense clinic, but other models exist.  For more about the “in-house” 
model, see Robert R. Rigg, Teaching Gideon — The Development and Challenges of 
a Criminal Defense Program, 7 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 111, 118-19 
(2004); Fell, supra note 184, at 284-85; and SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 201, 
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supervises a small group of student-attorneys.206  The student-
attorneys are awarded temporary licenses to practice law.207  
Typically, the clinic receives cases through collaboration with the 
public defender or via direct appointment by the court.208  Cases are 
chosen based on the nature of the crime charged, the prospect of a trial 
or other contested motions, and the likelihood of resolution within a 
semester or academic year.209  In most states, the client must provide 
written consent to student representation.210 
Clinic caseloads are manageable, at least in comparison to the 
avalanche of cases routinely handled by court-appointed defense 
counsel.211  Generally, teams of two or three student-attorneys are 
assigned to one case.212  Students share and divide responsibilities, 
functioning as client counselors, case investigators, and courtroom 
advocates.213  Ideally, the same students participate in a single case 
from the initial client meeting through the case’s conclusion.214  
at 252 (discussing the value of clinics with “at least two instructors, because clinical 
teaching involves so many novel teaching problems, and is so stressful, that a 
clinical teacher needs at least one colleague with whom to share problems on 
virtually a daily basis.”). 
206. Fell, supra note 184, at 285 (“The average ratio is eight to ten students to 
one faculty member.”). 
207. Cavazos, supra note 200, at 12; Valdez Carey, supra note 193, at 516 
(“Today, every state and most federal courts have rules that allow law students who 
are enrolled in clinics to represent clients in court under the direct supervision of a 
law school faculty member or a licensed attorney.”). 
208. Rigg, supra note 205, at 115 (discussing the challenges of receiving 
clients through the county public defender’s office versus direct appointment of 
cases by the court). 
209. Id. at 121-22. 
210. Quigley, supra note 201, at 492. 
211. Rigg, supra note 205, at 111-19 (“The class size is limited to four 
student-attorneys and each are assigned normally to no more than ten clients 
[charged with misdemeanors].”); see also SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 201 at 
247 (“At CALS, we have always chosen to make the students’ case load very low so 
that they could examine with great care every one of their decisions and actions.”). 
212. SCHRAG & MELTSNER. supra note 201, at 248 (“The reason for . . . 
collaboration [in clinics] is that joint effort usually produces better results . . . than 
individual work.”). 
213. Cavazos, supra note 200, at 28-29; Quigley, supra note 201 at 484-85. 
214. According to Lynda Johnston at Stanford Law School: 
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Through involvement from start to finish, students learn to forge 
lasting client relationships, establish short- and long-term case 
objectives, and manage various court-imposed deadlines.215 
Typically, the clinic director functions as an advisor, assisting 
students in developing a theory of the case, determining the 
appropriate motions to file, and navigating the court system.216  More 
broadly, the director helps students clarify the overarching goals of 
representation based upon the nature of the case, the desires and 
expectations of the client, and the probable outcome.217  When 
unexpected obstacles invariably arise, the director encourages students 
to “figure out a creative alternative . . . and . . . find the courage to 
deviate from the accepted norm of practice.”218  At a minimum, the 
director seeks to give the student-attorney an opportunity to play an 
impactful role in the case while ensuring that the client receives 
effective assistance of counsel throughout.219 
The Stanford Law School Criminal Defense Clinic receives its cases 
exclusively on referral from the Santa Clara County Public Defender’s Office 
and the San Mateo County Bar Association’s Private Defender 
Program.  With respect to selection criteria, our students represent only 
misdemeanor defendants.  [The clinic director] chooses cases for the 
pedagogical opportunities they present for our students.  In my observation, 
all the cases allow the students to take mastery (under very intensive instructor 
supervision) over the entire trajectory of a case, from pretrial conference 
through settlement, dismissal, or jury trial, and, if appropriate, through appeal.   
E-mail from Lynda Johnston, Legal Assistant, Stanford Law School, to author (Aug. 
5, 2013, 2:05 p.m. EST) (on file with author). 
215. Id. 
216. See Cavazos, supra note 200, at 30-31 (discussing the ideal 
communication between the supervisor and student-attorney). 
217. See SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 201, at 242-52 (discussing the 
goals of clinical education programs and how their various structures can achieve 
those goals). 
218. Id. at 250-51; see also Quigley, supra note 201 at 486 (discussing a 
system in which the director acts as lead counsel at the outset of the case but 
gradually cedes control as the “confiden[ce] and competen[ce]” of students 
increase.). 
219. Quigley, supra note 201 at 485; Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, 
Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1978) (“The tension between our 
roles as facilitators of intern-oriented learning and as supervisors on cases affecting 
actual clients’ interests is a constant, major theme in our work.”). 
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In addition to case management, supervisors must consider the 
student-attorney’s professional development.220  Often, clinic directors 
require students to maintain and periodically submit a journal 
reflecting on their work.221  Using the journal entries as a springboard 
for follow-up discussion, the director meets with students individually 
to offer guidance, support, or suggestions for problem-solving.222  
Additionally, most clinics include a “classroom component” in which 
students formulate litigation tactics, bolster trial skills, and discuss 
challenges with cases or clients.223  In class, the clinic director 
provides “feedback,” constructive “critiques,” and additional 
opportunities for “reflection.”224  In contrast to a typical law school 
course in which the sole evaluative opportunity is a final exam, these 
ongoing assessments foster a collaborative environment in which the 
director and student work together to enhance the quality of client 
representation and the overall clinical experience.225 
PART III 
CAPITAL MITIGATION INVESTIGATION IN NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE CLINICS: DEVELOPING A “THEORY FOR PRACTICE” 
The process of representing “real clients” in the clinical setting 
“[p]otentially . . . encompasses everything about being a lawyer.”226  
In light of the “almost infinite” number of “opportunities for [clinical] 
teaching and learning” in the process of “client representation,” a 
220. For a fascinating discussion of the challenges and rewards of student 
supervision in law school clinics, see Michael Meltsner, James V. Rowan & Daniel 
J. Givelber, The Bike Tour Leader’s Dilemma: Talking About Supervision, 13 VT. L. 
REV. 399 (1989). 
221. J.P. Ogilvy, The Use of Journals in Legal Education: A Tool for 
Reflection, 3 CLIN. L. REV. 55, 75 (1996).   
222. Id. 
223. See STUCKEY, supra note 199, at 145 (requiring as a “best practice” of in-
house clinics the inclusion of “classroom components that help accomplish the 
educational goals of the course.”); see also Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 
3 CLIN. L. REV. 175, 236-37 (1996); Rigg, supra note 205, at 117. 
224. Cavazos, supra note 200, at 9-10. 
225. Id. 
226. See STUCKEY, supra note 199, at 139 (“It is impossible to describe fully 
what a student might learn by participating as a lawyer in the representation of real 
clients.”). 
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“clear understanding[]” of “educational goals” is vital.227  Of equal 
importance is the development of effective strategies or models to 
pursue these goals–or what the Carnegie Report authors might call a 
“theory for practice.”228  A “theory for practice,” according to the 
study, is “a kind of toolkit of well-founded procedures within clearly 
delineated areas of professional work.”229  On one hand, a “theory for 
practice” can serve as the conceptual framework within which to 
articulate, enliven, and replicate clinical goals from one case or 
semester to the next.230  In addition, a “theory for practice” can 
“provide scaffolding” to “aid [student-attorneys] in navigating the 
complexities and uncertainties of developing case theory.”231 
The techniques of capital mitigation investigation can provide a 
“theory for practice” to achieve several pedagogical goals of non-
capital criminal defense clinics, especially as they relate to sentencing 
advocacy.  In addition, an investigative protocol can function as a 
framework—or “scaffolding”—to help student-attorneys compile, 
analyze, and present mitigation evidence.  Moreover, in light of the 
time-consuming and complex nature of mitigation investigation, 
creation of a standard clinical protocol can facilitate similar 
investigation for recent graduates who face oppressive caseloads and 
limited resources as public defenders.232 
227. Id. 
228. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 100-01.   
229. Id. at 101-03 (Stated another way, “[i]n the realm of teaching expert 
practice, theories are really statements of technique in the classic sense of well-
tested procedures for achieving specific outcomes in certain kinds of situations.”). 
230. Id. (“Just as the case-dialogue method at its best can represent in a public 
way the processes of reasoning embedded in complex legal opinions, it is likewise 
possible to articulate the conceptual models involved in the important skills that 
define effective lawyering: in developing evidence, interviewing, counseling, 
drafting documents, conducting research, and negotiating.”). 
231. Id. at 103.  A theory for practice can also help clinical students define, 
clarify, and reflect upon “key values” of the legal profession, some of which are not 
always readily definable—e.g., “the importance of seeking justice and providing 
access to justice.”  See STUCKEY, supra note 199, at 140. 
232. As Professor Phyllis Goldfarb writes in reference to the “theory for 
practice,” “[b]oth the Carnegie Hall-bound musician and the Carnegie Report-bred 
lawyer undergo a theoretically grounded developmental process of enacting 
underlying principles in performance, and only then do the principles acquire 
meaning, value, and life.”  Phyllis Goldfarb, Back to the Future of Clinical Legal 
Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 279, 290 (2012).   
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Capital Mitigation Investigation and Clinical Goals:233 
Learning Lawyering Skills 
Implementing a basic capital mitigation investigative model helps 
student-attorneys develop traditional lawyering skills such as 
investigating facts, acquiring records, interviewing witnesses, 
counseling clients, and writing persuasively.234  For example, through 
creation of a records collection protocol, student-attorneys learn the 
essential steps to obtain educational, medical, or governmental records 
and the process of analyzing those documents.235  Invariably, the 
records-acquisition process also includes unwanted lessons about 
bureaucratic entanglements that delay the receipt of documents and 
the importance of early requests for release.  More subtly, in the 
pursuit of records, student-attorneys gain an important lesson in the 
trust-building that precedes a request for a client’s signature to release 
sensitive records. 
Similarly, the process of conducting intensive interviews with the 
client and select others is critical training for the student-attorney.  As 
one clinical text describes, client interviewing combines the 
“intellectual challenge” of assessing the client’s legal problem with 
the “emotional challenge” of establishing a working relationship with 
a person who is often under considerable stress.236  Mitigation-focused 
interviews magnify these challenges in several ways.  First, due to the 
233. The educational goals I discuss are shared by most “live client” law 
school clinics, not just non-capital criminal defense clinics.  In addition, the goals 
are representative, not exhaustive.  The sources from which the goals are drawn 
include Schrag, supra note 223, at 245-47; STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. 
NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS, (4th ed. 2011); Susan Bryant, The 
Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 33 
(2001), and my own experience as a clinician.  
234. See Schrag, supra note 223, at 185, 187. 
235. As an ancillary point, the release process also helps the student become 
familiar with the releases required for specific records.  In some cases, records may 
be acquired with a boilerplate release.  In others, however, a unique form is required.  
For instance, most hospitals and other medical facilities require a release tailored to 
the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA).  In the same vein, refusal to release documents by a medical facility, 
prison, educational institution, or other body will, in many cases, provide the 
student-attorney an opportunity to secure and serve a subpoena duces tecum for the 
sought-after records.  
236. KRIEGER & NEUMANN , supra note 233, at 88. 
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sensitivity of the topics explored during mitigation interviews, the 
student-attorney must become especially adept at identifying and 
addressing inhibitors that obstruct the client’s candor.237  Further, in 
mitigation, the student-attorney must listen actively and 
empathetically to the client, a difficult skill to master.238  Moreover, 
the student-attorney’s use of a “client-centered” approach to 
representation, while vital to the mitigation interview, is uniquely 
challenging in this context.239  Client-centered lawyering “treat[s] the 
client as an effective collaborator (rather than as “a helpless person [in 
need of] rescue).”240  Often, though, mitigation interviews turn up 
information that paints the client in a desperate light.  To encourage 
the client’s disclosure of trauma, abject poverty, or addiction while 
simultaneously endorsing his role as an empowered and capable case 
collaborator requires a delicate touch.  Among other benefits, 
however, the client-centered approach “promotes the dignity of 
clients” in the midst of painful admissions and facilitates a personal 
relationship that often results in more productive dialogue.241 
Discovering Social Justice 
The records collection and interview process offer noteworthy 
examples of the way mitigation investigation often leads the student-
attorney to a fuller understanding of law and social justice.242  As 
Professor Phyllis Goldfarb writes, “[t]eaching lawyering in the context 
of assisting individuals and communities subordinated by social 
structures . . . opens dimensions for learning.”243  These “dimensions” 
include a “greater awareness” of the professional obligation to 
237. Id. at 91 (possible client “inhibitors” include embarrassment about 
divulging a legal problem, inability to remember events, and “cultural, social, age, 
or dialect barriers”). 
238. Id. at 92. 
239. Id. at 22 (quoting DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN M. PRICE, LEGAL 
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977)). 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 23 (quoting DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: 
WHO’S IN CHARGE? 168 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
242. Goldfarb, supra note 232, at 302-03; see also Dubin, supra note 187, at 
1477-78.  
243. Goldfarb, supra note 232, at 304. 
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promote “fairness, equality under the law, and equal access to justice” 
and an “understanding of what subordination means in people’s lives 
and how it operates on a regular basis.”244 
Teaching lawyering, as it relates to mitigation-intensive 
sentencing advocacy, is an especially effective method to instill social 
justice values in students.  By studying the client’s life experiences in-
depth, the student-attorney gains a sense of the “relationship between 
law and issues of social justice at both broad[-]based and personal 
levels.”245  Broadly, the student-attorney develops insight into ways in 
which an ostensibly fair, just, and impartial legal process often 
disproportionately penalizes marginalized communities.246  More 
personally, the realization of such disparity often causes the student-
attorney to question previous notions of “how the world works” and 
leads to a changed societal perspective.247  The development of a 
social justice-influenced perspective has both immediate and lasting 
benefits.  In the short term, the student-attorney, through a deeper 
understanding of the client, will likely become a more zealous 
advocate for the client’s interests.  Over the long run, the impactful 
experience of representation will inform the student-attorney’s 
professional choices with respect to public or pro bono service. 
Developing Cross-Cultural Awareness 
In similar fashion, mitigation investigation serves to build a core 
clinical teaching objective: cross-cultural awareness.248  Cross-cultural 
awareness, as the term implies, occurs when law students “learn by 
244. Id. at 302-04. 
245. Dubin, supra note 187, at 1477 (quoting Fran Quigley, Seizing the 
Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in 
Law School Clinics, 2 CLIN. L. REV. 37, 43 (1995)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
246. See id. at 1477-78 (positing that “many law students come to [law 
school]” without “significant exposure” to the “victims of injustice” and have 
limited experience dealing with an “unresponsive legal system”) (quoting Quigley, 
supra note 245, at 52-53) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
247. Id. (quoting Quigley, supra note 245, at 51) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
248. For a detailed and fascinating discussion on teaching diversity issues in 
clinics, see generally Bryant, supra note 233. 
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interacting closely with people from other cultures.”249  “When 
lawyers and clients come from different cultures,” writes Professor 
Susan Bryant, “several aspects” of representation are “implicated,” 
including the “capacity to form trusting relationships,  . . to develop 
client-centered case strategies and solutions, [and] to gather 
information.”250  Bryant emphasizes that “non-judgmental thinking” is 
central to developing cross-cultural awareness.251  Such thinking, she 
writes, encompasses the ability to “enter into the cultural imagination 
of another” and reframe as “‘normal things that at first seem bizarre or 
strange.’”252 
Mitigation investigation encourages this synergistic thought 
process.  As previously discussed, the capital mitigation specialist 
must view evidence from the perspective of the client’s cultural 
background, and dismantle false assumptions about race, ethnicity, or 
religion to contextualize experiences with which the jury may be 
unfamiliar.  If, for example, student-attorneys make “assumptions and 
judgments” about the client that “grow out of [their] own cultural 
blinders,” an intensive exploration into the client’s background often 
generates positive self-reflection.253  In much the same way, 
mitigation investigation helps “expose [student-attorneys] to the 
limitations of relying on their own experiences to interpret client 
behavior.”254  In other words, rather than resting on first impressions, 
an in-depth investigation exalts “the importance of searching for 
alternative explanations” for the client’s actions.255  Finally, as Bryant 
stresses, cross-cultural awareness requires the development of “deep 
listening skills.”256  Much like active listening, “deep listening” 
249. Schrag, supra note 223, at 182. 
250. Bryant, supra note 233 at 41-42. 
251. Id. at 56. 
252. Id. (quoting RAYMONDE CARROLL, CULTURAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS: 
THE FRENCH-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 2 (1988)). 
253. Id. at 88.  As Bryant describes, “students will begin asking themselves 
questions such as: Why I am judging this client negatively?  Is it because we have 
different values, experiences, or opportunities?”  Id. 
254. Id. at 93. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 94 (“Most students who were encouraged in their childhood to 
pursue a legal career probably received this advice because they displayed a 
tendency to argue, not because they were good listeners.”). 
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involves patience, empathy, and an ability to recognize “non-verbal 
cues” from both sides that may impede the exchange.257  As “deep 
listening skills” are not easily acquired, Bryant encourages student-
attorneys to “look for red flags—clues that something is going wrong” 
during client interviews.258  In noting and reflecting on “red flags,” 
student-attorneys are apt to discover the source of the 
miscommunication and formulate an approach to improve subsequent 
interaction.259  By requiring student-attorneys to work with clients in 
depth, detail, and around sensitive subject matter, mitigation 
investigation is an ideal forum to practice and cultivate deep listening 
skills. 
Integrating Facts and Law 
Non-capital mitigation investigation also teaches clinical students 
to think about the relationship between facts, evidence, and legal 
theory.  Specifically, unlike the “pure story” of the capital mitigation 
narrative, the non-capital narrative must be framed with the applicable 
sentencing statutes or guidelines in mind.  Thus, the non-capital 
student-attorney must consider, for example, how hospital records 
reflecting the client’s multiple prescription drug overdoses should be 
handled in light of the federal statutory mandate that “the sentence 
imposed . . . promote[s] respect for the law” and “provide[s] the 
defendant with needed . . . medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner.”260  If the records are utilized, 
the student-attorney must then devise an effective strategy to move 
them into evidence.  Professor Philip Schrag calls this process 
“[c]oping with facts.”261  Schrag notes the tendency in clinics to spend 
“far more time discovering facts” and turning “those facts into 
admissible evidence” than considering legal theory (in contrast to the 
approach in doctrinal courses to “take facts as given and study only 
law and policy”).262  Because “working on cases inevitably requires 
257. Id. at 94-95. 
258. Id. at 95. 
259. Id. 
260. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2010).  
261. Schrag, supra note 223, at 182 (emphasis omitted). 
262. Id. 
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the appropriate linkages to be made,” Schrag strives to help students 
understand the relationship between facts, legal theory, and evidence 
in his clinic.263  By requiring students to link mitigation facts, 
sentencing law, and evidentiary concerns, the non-capital presentation 
exemplifies the coping process Schrag describes. 
Building Creativity and Courage 
As Schrag and others suggest, a critical piece of clinical teaching 
is instilling in students the confidence and ingenuity to devise creative 
solutions for complex legal problems.264  Clinical students, Schrag 
writes, are “startled by how successful they can be by allowing 
themselves to be imaginative.”265  The mitigation narrative demands 
both creativity and courage.  Faced with a daunting amount of often 
conflicting and complicated evidence, the student-attorney must craft 
a persuasive and credible presentation.  Doing so requires not only 
astute analysis of the evidence but also the imagination to reconstruct 
the client’s history in the most compelling light.  Moreover, the 
presentation, by its very nature, deviates from the legal jargon and 
case citations that dominate most court pleadings.  Rather, the 
mitigation narrative, in the words of the Carnegie Report, centers on 
the placement of “things and events . . . within a story.”266  As a result, 
the presentation necessitates that the student-attorney have the 
conviction to break from the well-traveled path of antiseptic legal 
arguments and, instead, tell a story rich in detail, imagery, and 
emotion.  Fortunately, the impact of the student-attorney’s courage 
and creativity as measured in less-punitive, more rehabilitation-
focused sentences is, to paraphrase Schrag, often startling. 
Improving Advocacy 
Most important, the use of a capital mitigation investigation 
model forwards a baseline goal of all criminal defense clinics: 
providing zealous representation.267  The mitigation narrative may be 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 184-85. 
265. Id. at 184. 
266. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31 at 96, 122-23. 
267. See Rigg, supra note 205, at 112-14. 
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utilized during plea negotiations or integrated into pre-sentencing 
pleadings in place of boilerplate introductory language and generic 
pleas for leniency.  Even in misdemeanor cases, in which 
incarceration for one year or less is at stake, a cohesive and moving 
mitigation presentation can have a significant impact on the case 
outcome.268 
Ellen Shultz, a capital mitigation specialist who has worked in the 
Eastern and Northern Districts of Virginia, believes a basic capital 
mitigation protocol is “readily transferable” to non-capital cases.269  
For such a model, Shultz recommends creation of “a contact list, 
records list, and social history timeline” through initial interviews with 
the client and others close to him.270  The mitigation narrative based 
on the resulting evidence can serve to enlighten the court about the 
defendant’s “history and characteristics” at sentencing.271 
As the following excerpts from sentencing narratives exemplify, a 
mitigation investigation based on a model like the one Shultz 
describes can produce powerful results.  First, from a review of school 
records, a vivid snapshot of the defendant’s turbulent childhood and 
the “need for the sentence . . . to provide [him] with needed 
educational or vocational training,” is possible:272 
268. For instance, in Illinois, as elsewhere, offenders convicted of a 
misdemeanor may be sentenced to up to one year in jail.  JUNAID AFEEF ET AL., ILL. 
CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTH., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2005), available at 
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/researchreports/policies_and_procedures_of_t
he_illinois_criminal_justice_system_aug2012.pdf.  Unlike felony convictions, 
however, after which the probability of a custodial sentence is high, a sentencing 
court has “several options” in misdemeanor cases.  Id. at 25.  Examples include a 
“diversion program” in which judgment in the case is suspended for “a specific 
period of time [and] [i]f the offender complies with all conditions set by the court, 
the offender will be released without a conviction.”  Id.  Another example is drug 
probation for first offenders in which successful completion of a substance abuse 
treatment program may result in an expunged conviction.  Id. at 26.  In light of the 
alternative sentencing options available in misdemeanor cases, presentation of 
mitigating evidence about the defendant’s background and history may be especially 
critical. 
269. E-mail from Ellen Shultz, Capital Mitigation Specialist, to author (Aug. 
8, 2013, 9:24 a.m. EST) (on file with author). 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2010). 
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Paul was shuffled between homes and schools frequently.  
Beginning in first grade, he attended six schools in as many years, 
sometimes transferring in the middle of the academic year back to a 
school he previously attended.  The instability had a detrimental 
impact on Paul’s academic and social development.  He was held 
back in first grade after attending two different schools and moving 
three times.  He repeated the grade, but remained at the same home 
and school for the entire academic year.  In a stable environment, 
Paul’s performance improved dramatically.  He received a 
cumulative grade of A in mathematics, A in spelling, B in language 
arts, and C in reading.  By contrast, in second grade, Paul lived at 
three separate addresses and attended as many schools.  He 
received grades of D or F in all aforementioned subjects.  The 
disruptive pattern continued as Paul was moved through different 
schools and residences, including two foster homes, over the next 
four years.  He dropped out of school in the seventh grade.273 
In another narrative, client interviews supported by foster care 
records shape an argument about the client’s “lesser role” as a courier 
in a drug trafficking enterprise:274 
In the days after her mother’s arrest on drug charges, Sheri’s step-
father returned from Illinois.  Unable to locate a relative in 
Clarksville to care for Sheri or her two siblings, he took the 
children to an impoverished, crime-ridden neighborhood in 
Chicago.  Once there, Sheri began suffering physical abuse at the 
hands of her step-father and his girlfriend.  The children were soon 
sent to an aunt, who lacked the interest or resources to provide for 
them.  Social services intervened, and Sheri and her siblings were 
split into different homes.  Sheri would never live with her brother 
or sister again.  She was not even nine-years-old.275 
273. Sentencing Memorandum (M.D. Tenn. June 9, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
274. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (providing that the court should consider the 
“nature and circumstances of the offense” when determining a particular sentence); 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a) (2010) (providing that if the 
defendant was a “minimal participant” in the offense their offense level may be 
reduced by four levels under the Sentencing Guidelines). 
275. Sentencing Memorandum (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2005) (on file with 
author). 
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In another excerpt, interviews with the client and family members 
capture the impact of the client’s early childhood in war-torn El 
Salvador to mitigate his unlawful entry into the United States and 
subsequent gang involvement: 
As the civil war escalated, bloodshed and suffering became a daily 
reality for the residents of Albornoz.  Located close to a 
government military base, the town was a target for revolutionaries.  
Seven-year-old Ronald saw bodies in the streets and heard constant 
gunfire as he lay in bed at night.  Often, school was cancelled 
amidst rumors of approaching guerrilla troops.  For a time, 
Ronald’s family shuffled between their home and the western 
village of Arce in an effort to escape the violence.  The respite was 
always short-lived, though, and the journey often proved more 
harrowing than daily life in Albornoz.276 
Finally, records documenting the recent incarceration of a client’s 
estranged spouse demonstrate the client’s extraordinary “family ties 
and responsibilities” as a single parent:277 
James is a single father.  Should he be imprisoned, the family will 
be hard-pressed to find an alternate care-giver for the boys.  
James’s wife, Melissa, is not a suitable choice.  Though Melissa is 
the boys’ birth mother, she has been estranged from the family 
since 1999.  Melissa has been recalcitrant in fulfilling her child 
support obligations and has been jailed on several occasions for 
non-payment.  Also, in 2001, she was convicted of theft of property 
for stealing money and cellular phone from her brother “to trade for 
drugs.”  In addition, she was arrested on January 18, 2007 in 
Williamson County on felony vehicle theft charge.  She is currently 
on bond and awaiting trial on March 20, 2006.278 
276. Sentencing Memorandum (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
277. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2004) (“Family 
responsibilities that are complied with may be relevant to the determination of the 
amount of restitution or fine.”). 
278. Sentencing Memorandum (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
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CONCLUSION 
The enormous volume of criminal defendants who enter guilty 
pleas combined with Booker’s widening of judicial sentencing 
discretion make mitigation investigation in non-capital cases more 
critical than ever.  However, despite the unprecedented demand for 
effective advocacy, few non-capital defense counsel possess the skill, 
resources, or time to conduct intensive investigation or put forth 
innovative mitigation presentations. 
To respond to this need, law school criminal defense clinics offer 
an ideal arena to introduce mitigation-intensive advocacy.  As a 
“theory for practice,” techniques used by capital mitigation specialists 
are especially instructive.  First, a model drawn from capital 
mitigation investigation advances several longstanding goals of 
clinical education.  In addition, as the “very depth of the involvement” 
of live client representation “can be debilitating” for student-attorneys, 
such a model offers structure and guidance in the complex area of 
mitigation investigation.279  Further, a clinical model based on capital 
mitigation investigation can help student-attorneys to develop a 
comparable protocol for later use in practice.  Most critically, the 
implementation of capital mitigation techniques in criminal defense 
clinics will enable student-attorneys to better advocate for outcomes 
that reflect the dignity, humanity, and individuality of every client. 
 
279. Jennifer Howard, Learning to ‘Think Like a Lawyer’ Through 
Experience, 2 CLIN. L. REV. 167, 180 (1995) (quoting Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical 
Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from 
Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284, 
287 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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